Rep. John Moolenaar (R-MI), Chairman of the House Select China Committee has written Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnik asking for a briefing on exxport controls on access to American universities' supercomputing resources.
Artificial intelligence (AI) has rapidly emerged as a transformative technology with significant implications for economic growth, scientific advancement, and national security. The U.S. Department of Commerce's Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS), along with its Emerging Technology Technical Advisory Committee (ETTAC), has been evaluating the implications of AI export controls. A March 10 ETTAC public meeting highlighted some of the challenges, strategies, and policy directions to manage the proliferation of AI-related technologies while defending the West’s competitive edge.
In contrast to the Treasury Department's flurry of staffing announcements, the Commerce Department quietly updated its website this week, detailing the staff incoming BIS Chief Jeffrey Kessler will rely on to ensure trade security. The appointment of James Rokas as Mr. Kessler's principal deputy has been thrown into doubt, as Chief of Staff Robert Burkett has replaced Mr. Rokas as acting undersecretary.
The Emerging Technology Technical Advisory Committee (ETTAC) will meet on March 10, 2025, to advise and assist the Secretary of Commerce and other Federal officials on matters related to export control policies. The public session will include working group reports, open business discussions, and industry presentations. DATES: The meeting will be held on March 10, 2025, from 9 a.m. to 4 p.m., Eastern Time.
The Commerce Department has reportedly suspended processing applications for new export licenses with no communication to stakeholders. The pause has created confusion among users of the Simplified Network Application Process Redesign (SNAP-R) system, managed by the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) within the U.S. Department of Commerce. Department leadership is in flux, pending the installation of political appointees.
Rep Mark Green (R-TN) once again introduced his China Technology Transfer Control Act, having failed to advance the initiative in the 116th, 117th and 118th Congress. There were no co-sponsors. The bill controls exports of certain national interest technology and intellectual property to China, calling for the US Trade Representative to maintain a designated list of product components subject to enforcement.
Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) has updated its License Application Portal. In addition to the current application process, the License Application Portal now features an option to establish an account to submit requests for specific licenses or interpretive guidance, or submit reports required by some specific licenses.
On February 11, 2025, the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) issued a correcting amendment to the interim final rule published on January 16, 2025, titled “Implementation of Additional Due Diligence Measures for Advanced Computing Integrated Circuits; Amendments and Clarifications; and Extension of Comment Period.” This correction revises Export Control Classification Number (ECCN) 3A090 by amending its license requirements table. Specifically, the first row’s first column is changed from “RS applies to the entire entry, except 3A090.a” to “RS applies to 3A090.a.” This modification clarifies that regional stability controls apply solely to ECCN 3A090.a items.
A European Commission report assessing patterns of Member-State exports of dual-use items shows that both authorisations and denials for the export of those most sensitive goods is on the rise as compared to 2021. The report includes, for the first time, extensive information on licensing data that will allow for a better understanding of how export controls are applied, and the risks identified relating to exports of sensitive items in the current geopolitical context.
House China hawks called for the National Security Advisor to review the potential national security benefits of placing export controls on semiconductor chips critical to the AI infrastructure of People's Republic of China (PRC) company, DeepSeek. As part of the review, the lawmakers also asked to strengthen controls on shipments through third countries that pose a high risk of diversion to the PRC. The lawmakers further requested that Mr. Waltz consider updating Federal Acquisition Regulations to prohibit the federal government from acquiring AI systems based on PRC models such as DeepSeek, except for appropriate intelligence and research purposes.
The State Department released an update on the prior year's arms trade, with Foreign Military Sales at their highest levels in history and Direct Commercial Sales up smartly from the prior period. In FY2024 the total value of transferred defense articles and services and security cooperation activities conducted under the Foreign Military Sales system was $117.9 billion. This represents a 45.7% increase, up from $80.9 billion in FY2023.
The Department of State amends the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) to remove from the U.S. Munitions List (USML) items that no longer warrant inclusion, add to the USML items that warrant inclusion, and clarify certain entries. With these amendments, the Department also supersedes and thus terminates the temporary modification to USML Category VIII that was published on December 4, 2023, and extended on November 26, 2024.
BIS added 11 Chinese entities to the Entity List, 10 for advanced artificial intelligence research and one for development of lithography technology for advanced-node fabrication facilities. The committee also removed three Indian nuclear research entities after diplomatic considerations. In another filing the same day, BIS added 16 entities to the Entity List, under the destinations of China, People's Republic of (China) (14) and Singapore (2) due to their involvement in supporting or directly contributing to the development of advanced computing integrated circuits (ICs) that further China's development of advanced weapons systems, weapons of mass destruction, and high-tech surveillance applications, and because these entities supply Chinese public security end users and pose a risk of diversion to Huawei, an entity on the Entity List. …
Alan Estevez, Undersecretary of Commerce for Industry and Security, delivered remarks January 14th at Washington's CSIS Wadhwani AI Center, focusing on the evolving role of export controls in safeguarding U.S. national security and addressing technological threats. The conversation, moderated by Greg Allen, Director of CSIS's Wadhwani AI Center, covered key achievements, challenges, and future priorities for the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS).
The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) is revising the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) to provide additional due diligence procedures for advanced computing integrated circuits (ICs). This interim final rule (IFR) aims to safeguard U.S. national security and support foundries and Outsourced Semiconductor Assembly and Test (OSAT) companies in complying with EAR provisions related to advanced computing ICs in the supply chain. Additionally, the IFR updates and clarifies changes introduced in BIS’s December 2, 2024, IFR, titled “Foreign-Produced Direct Product Rule Additions, and Refinements to Controls for Advanced Computing and Semiconductor Manufacturing Items” (FDP IFR).
The Biden Administration released its proposed "AI Diffusion Rule" Monday morning, aiming to control exports of chips used for artificial intelligence. Quotas will restrict the number of chips to be exported to about 120 countries, while a short list of G-7 and other allied countries are exempt from restrictions. Sales to China, Iran, Russia & North Korea are blocked. The limits focus on Advanced Graphics Processing Units (GPUs) used to train AI models. Cloud services providers like AWS and Microsoft will enjoy some waivers from the rules, in a material concession to the data center industry. Cloud providers will have geographic limits, ensuring no more than half their computing power resides offshore.
January 6th, The Commerce Department added 13 entities to the Entity List under the destinations of Burma (1), China, People's Republic of (China) (11), and Pakistan (1). The Chinese firms were added for acquiring and attempting to acquire U.S.-origin items in support of China's military modernization. In addition, these entities have "demonstrable ties to activities of concern, including hypersonic weapons development, design and modeling of vehicles in hypersonic flight, using proprietary software to model weapons design and damage; and otherwise supporting China's military-civil fusion efforts," according to the Commerce Department. The entities are added with a license requirement for the export, reexport, and transfer (in-country) of all items subject to the EAR and a license review policy of presumption of denial.
The United States has adjusted its policy on implementing the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) to expand access to some weapons for its allies, the White House said. Now, the US authorities must show greater flexibility in considering each specific case of export of such technologies, and facilitate the transfer of "certain MTCR Category I military missiles, Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS), and Space Launch Vehicle (SLV) systems to certain partners with strong export control systems."
As the Biden Administration prepares to hand over the reins, there's a palpable sense of urgency to get as much regulatory work done as possible before January 20th. The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) regulatory agenda has dozens of rulemaking actions underway, including further steps targeting the illicit trade in advanced chips. The Global Artificial Intelligence Diffusion" rule aims to control the global shipments of graphics processing units (GPUs) to forestall diversion through third countries. Restrictions are said to include geographic controls as well as a worldwide licensing system that includes reporting requirements and exceptions.
The Bureau of Industry and Security is seeking public comments on regulations addressing risks posed by information and communications technology and services (ICTS) integral to unmanned aircraft systems. BIS seeks public feedback on several matters including: definitions of UAS and components, assessments of how potential classes of ICTS transactions integral to UAS may present undue or unacceptable risks to U.S. national security, evaluations of risk posed by different foreign adversaries, potential processes for the public to request approval to engage in an otherwise prohibited transaction, the economic impact such regulation could have on certain entities, and, where feasible, potential mitigation measures.
