Australia Group at 40 - Reforms to Chem-Bio Regime

The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), on behalf of the EU Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Consortium, released a major policy paper marking the 40th anniversary of the Australia Group (AG).

Authored by Kolja Brockmann, the study presents a comprehensive assessment of the AG’s institutional evolution, operational practices, and contemporary challenges in an era of intensifying geopolitical competition and rapid technological innovation.

The AG, created in 1985 in response to revelations of Western-origin chemical precursors used in the Iran–Iraq War, serves as a voluntary export control regime aimed at preventing the proliferation of chemical and biological weapons (CBW).

Over four decades, it has grown from 15 founding members to 42 participating states and the European Union, expanding its control lists to include biological weapons-related items, dual-use equipment, and emerging technology.

Despite this growth, the report notes that the AG has not undergone significant structural reform in over a decade.

It faces mounting pressure to adapt to a rapidly shifting landscape marked by dual-use technology diffusion, contested multilateralism, and the increased weaponization of trade policy.

The study identifies persistent challenges in three areas: institutional functionality, membership and adherence, and the regime’s transparency and perceived legitimacy.

“While the AG remains the only major multilateral export control regime without Russian participation, and thus comparatively less affected by the fallout from the Ukraine conflict, it is not immune to geopolitical turbulence,” Brockmann writes. He highlights the threat posed by unilateral controls and mini-lateral groupings that risk undermining AG consensus-based decision-making.

In terms of outreach, the report criticizes the limited use of the AG’s adherence mechanism—only one state, Kazakhstan, has declared unilateral adherence—and recommends better articulation and expansion of the benefits offered to adherents.

It calls for clearer communication, including more frequent public updates, detailed guidance documents, and enhanced engagement with non-member states, particularly those with emerging biotech sectors.

The report also examines growing criticism of the AG’s legitimacy, particularly from developing countries and China, which has spearheaded recent UN General Assembly resolutions on the right to peaceful uses of technology.

The AG’s confidential operations and selective membership, critics argue, conflict with broader disarmament obligations under the Biological Weapons Convention and Chemical Weapons Convention.

To address these issues, the report offers a series of recommendations:

• Develop a forward-looking vision for expanding membership and adherence.
• Publish and disseminate public goods, including good practices and technical guidance.
• Strengthen transparency through consistent public reporting and outreach.
• Bolster participation in global disarmament and non-proliferation forums.
• Mitigate geopolitical pressures by reinforcing the AG’s multilateral and apolitical mandate.

The author concludes that unless the AG undertakes reforms to modernize its practices and reinforce its legitimacy, it risks stagnation. “To remain relevant,” Brockmann argues, “the AG must become a more visible, inclusive, and responsive platform for harmonized export control in the CBW domain.”

The full report, The Australia Group at 40: Making the AG Fit for an Era of Geopolitical Competition, is available via SIPRI and the EU Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Consortium. [Link]