Gallagher Committee Queries DNI on Cuba Developments

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House Select Committee on the Chinese Communist Party Rep. Mike Gallagher (R-Wisc) wants information on whether Chinese telecommunications companies like Huawei and ZTE are aiding Beijing in spying on the United States from Cuba.

In a letter to Director of National Intelligence Avril Haines and Commerce Secretary Gina Raimondo Rep. Gallagher is seeking immediate answers following detailed reports of an active Chinese spy base in Cuba.

“In light of the PRC’s approach to modernizing its defense and intelligence capabilities, it is clear any enhancement or expansion of PRC SIGINT capabilities in Cuba is likely to be aided by PRC telecommunications companies,” he said.

“Having offices and business operations in Cuba would provide cover for PRC SIGINT operators to travel to and from the island without creating the same suspicion as official travel,” he continued. “Huawei, for example, has assisted the Cuban government in modernizing its telecommunications and Internet infrastructure since the 2000s, and, like ZTE and Great Dragon Information Technology, has a permanent presence there.”

Beijing’s intelligence agency and the Chinese companies supporting it “have relied in part on accessing or exploiting US intellectual property, even as they have undermined US interests, violated

US export control restrictions, and boosted the surveillance and censorship capabilities of authoritarian states,” he wrote in the letter.

Questions Asked
Rep. Gallagher asked for responses to the following questions about the intelligence community’s awareness of the connections between PRC SIGINT and commercial activities and whether this information has been used to inform ongoing export licensing decisions:

  1. Which PRC information and communications technology companies provide support to the PRC SIGINT program outside the PRC, including technical support and operational cover?
  2. Have the identities and activities of these companies and their contribution to PRC SIGINT operations been shared with the Department of Commerce, or any other member of the End-User Review Committee?
  3.  How many applications for export licenses to these PRC companies have been approved since the Intelligence Community reportedly became aware of the PRC SIGINT facilities in Cuba in 2019? How many of these applications did the Department of Commerce reject? How many of the approved applications are for products that could enable SIGINT collection, processing, or analysis?
  4.  Do any of these companies have export licenses pending before the Department of Commerce?

  5. Did the Intelligence Community’s knowledge of these companies and their support to PRC SIGINT operations factor in decisions on whether to grant licenses? Will it factor in decisions currently facing the Department of Commerce?

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